[wplug] OpenSSL security vulnerability
Patrick Wagstrom
patrick at wagstrom.net
Thu May 15 09:49:36 EDT 2008
I haven't seen any discussion of this, but it's actually very important.
Some time ago, approximately two years, a single line was removed from the
Debian installation of OpenSSL. Reading around, it looks like it was
removed because the line caused a problem when profiling the code with
Valgrind. Unfortunately, this had the nasty side effect of reducing the
possible key space to 2^15 keys instead of 2^1024 possible keys. Yeah, it
took two years for people to realize this.
In that time span, Ubuntu, which uses/steals lots of stuff from Debian has
achieved massive popularity, thus the defect is much more popular than just
Debian. Also, the problem affects more than just servers -- in fact the
server issue is quite moot compared to the elephant in the room.
The biggest issue is that any SSH private keys you may have generated in
that time are now vulnerable to a fairly easy dictionary attack. Knowing
that most people use 1024 or 2048 bit public keys, you can already go and
complete key sets on the net, and I'd imagine that by this evening the 4096
set will be available to download. Thus, if you run a machine that accepts
SSH passwordless login, you're now on borrowed time if ANYONE HAS USED A
DEBIAN SYSTEM TO GENERATE KEYS. With a simple username there are only
98304 possible keys to try.
So, system administrators, unless it's completely untenable, you should
consider disabling passwordless login until you've confirmed that all users
have changed their private key.
Once again, because of the vulnerability with SSH public keys, any system
that has a key generated by a debian user is vulnerable. Don't get all
haughty thinking you're immune because you run Fedora, FreeBSD, or OpenBSD.
I'm looking forward to scads of dictionary attacks in the near future.
--Patrick
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